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ABSTRACT

Civil liberties are rights enjoyed by individuals guaranteeing them protection from the arbitrary or discriminatory acts of government. Kohlberg's cognitive-developmental theory of moral reasoning and studies of behavioral/abstract attitudinal measures provide a rationale for examining moral reasoning processes, intelligence, and selected personality and demographic variables in relations to civil liberties attitudes and to a behavioral measure of support for civil liberties. An adult college sample (N=162) was used to test hypotheses that moral reasoning scores and the specified measures of individual differences would be significantly correlated with both the behavioral (petition signing) and the attitudinal measures of civil liberties. Results indicated that the sample was moderately pro-libertarian on both the behavioral and attitudinal measures. Partial confirmation of the hypotheses occurred; scores of moral reasoning and of intelligence correlated positively with the behavioral measures. The personality variables of authoritarianism and dogmatism correlated negatively with the civil liberties attitude score. The data offered moderate support for Kohlberg's cognitive-developmental theory of moral reasoning. (Author)

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Civil Liberties Support in Relation To Moral Reasoning Scores

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Civil Liberties Support In Relation To Moral Reasoning Scores

The primary purpose of this study was to investigate the relationships among attitudes on civil liberties issues, a behavioral indicator of support for civil liberties and an individual's stage of moral development. In addition several personality and demographic variables were measured to assess their relationship to civil liberties.

Civil liberties are those guarantees that an individual enjoys against the arbitrary or discriminatory acts of government. As a concept it is closely related to, but different from civil rights which are positive enactments of government against the arbitrary acts of individuals or the government. For their research Zalkind and Schwartz (1971) defined civil liberties attitudes as those having to do with the Constitution of the United States, specifically the Bill of Rights. Within the framework of civil liberties are issues of freedom of speech, assembly, freedom from double jeopardy, unreasonable search and seizure, denial of due process and the rights to trial, counsel and the confrontation of witnesses.

Kohlberg's (1958, 1969 & 1973) conceptualization of the development of a hierarchical sequence of moral reasoning processes has been a primary concern within this research study. The study aimed to test the assumption that the more

intricate (advanced) moral reasoning processes would be reflected in (i.e., correlated with) civil liberties attitudes. It was thought that individuals who have more advanced reasoning might transcend what may be their own opinions on specific topics and defend the abstract principles as well as the concrete applications of the principles (e.g., the right of free speech for an apparent racist).

It was hoped that a study correlating the cognitive stage score of moral reasoning to civil liberties attitudes and behavior could become a basis for later active experimentation. Thus, in time, we might better understand an aspect of the less than complete support for civil liberties issues as reported by such researchers as Selvin and Hagstrom (1960), Erskine (1970) and Erskine and Siegel (1975).

Behavioral Science Research on Civil Liberties

The paucity of research on civil liberties was first reported by Hyman and Sheatsley (1953) and restated some twenty-two years later by Zalkind (1975). There has been considerably more research in the related area of civil rights, but a slowly growing body of literature has emerged which is providing a clearer picture of the attitudes held by Americans in the domain of civil liberties. Stouffer's (1955) landmark study based upon a rational sample of

nearly 5,000 subjects reported that only low-moderate levels of support existed for selected civil liberties.

Erskine's (1970) analysis of long term trends among attitudes expressed by national samples suggests, that despite a lack of uniformity among available data, different wordings and emphasis in questions and the uncontrolled impact of historical conditions, it is probably safe to conclude that there was only partial support for free speech during the time period covering 1938-69. The right to dissent also experienced less than full support in the same time period. In a subsequent summary of public opinion poll data Erskine and Siegel (1975) report a liberalizing trend in the direction of greater support for those rights. From replications of Stouffer's study, Davis (1975) and Nunn (1978) report similar findings. Sullivan (1979), however, claims that the apparent liberalization is a function of the target groups toward which tolerance is measured and that the public would give strong support for civil liberties to currently unpopular groups.

Although the freedoms and rights enunciated in the Bill of Rights express what are supposed to be some of the basic values of this country, research in the area suggests only low-moderate levels of support for civil liberties when it comes to specific applications of the

abstract principles (Erskine and Siegel, 1975; Montero, 1975; Wilson, 1975; Zellman, 1975). This view was suggested by Selvin and Hagstrom (1960) and Support for this belief about civil liberties has been reported by McClosky (1964) using a national sample and in subgroup samples assessed by Mack (1956) and Zellman and Sears (1971).

Some researchers have focused upon various moderating variables in relation to support for civil liberties. Stouffer's early report (1955) of prolibertarian attitudes being associated with higher levels of education has generally been replicated (McClosky, 1958; Erskine and Siegel, 1975; Prothro and Grigg, 1960; Montero, 1975; Jackman, 1972; Zalkind and Schwartz, 1971; Wilson, 1975; and Gaugler and Zalkind, 1975). Jackman (1972) suggested that the research may be understood if one considers that the more educated person probably thinks more abstractly and possesses a greater ability to conceptualize a given problem.

Support for civil liberties has also been studied in relation to selected personality variables. Data from DiPalma and McClosky (1970); Izzett (1972) and Zalkind, Gaugler and Schwartz (1975) suggest that individuals with characteristics similar to Adorno et al's (1950) "authori-

tarian personality" may exhibit lower levels of support for civil liberties than individuals not so characterized. Individuals with more pro-libertarian attitudes are reported to be more flexible, independent and self reliant while those with lower levels of support for civil liberties were described as more rigid, conformist and less self reliant, even when age, socio-economic status and education were statistically controlled (Zalkind et al, 1975).

Grabb (1979) has tested Lipset's view of working-class authoritarianism and reports that the direct effect of occupational class on tolerance of outgroups is not significant when education, income and degree of cynicism are simultaneously taken into account. Other moderating variables have been studied in relation to civil liberties. Among those offering some promise are dogmatism (Izzett, 1972), need for social approval (Bay, 1967; Kerpleman, 1969), and psychological adjustment (Keniston, 1967).

Kohlberg's (1969, 1973) cognitive-developmental theory of moral reasoning appeared to offer a way to understand some of the civil liberties findings. The types of ideas that are used by an individual in the solution of moral conflicts might better enable us to understand the support for the abstract concepts of civil liberties but not the specific applications of the concepts in concrete situations. The six

Piaget-like stages of moral reasoning are discussed below.

Starting in reverse order with the perhaps arbitrarilly labelled highest stage Candee (1975) suggested that at what Kohlberg labels the post-conventional level of moral reasoning there is a desire to maximize physical life and property, which in Candee's opinion includes the right of speech, assembly and action. From a somewhat western moral viewpoint these rights are basic to human beings and any law or system which denied these rights would be morally incorrect. The post-conventional level of moral development is seen as something more than simply learning cultural rules or values. It was felt that such a reasoner might go beyond support for the abstract concepts of civil liberties and also support a libertarian position that might encourage the right to advocate a personally unacceptable view.

The post-conventional level (stages 5 and 6) appears to incorporate an effort to define moral values and principles which have validity and application apart from the authority of the groups or persons holding those principles, and apart from the individual's own identification with those groups (Kohlberg, 1971). More specifically the stage six individual is one who defines right by a decision of conscience in accord with self chosen ethical principles including justice,

reciprocity, equality of human rights and respect for the dignity of human beings as individual persons (Kohlberg, 1971).

A person with stage five social contract orientation is one who sees right actions as defined in terms of general individual rights and standards which have been critically examined and agreed upon by the whole society. Although they tend to look upon that which is constitutionally and democratically agreed to, right is also a matter of personal values and opinions. In a somewhat related research area, that of political-social activism, Haan, Smith and Block (1968) reported that post-conventional reasoners tended to be more politically liberal with higher levels of political-social activity than individuals of lower moral reasoning levels.

The conventional moral reasoner (stages 3 and 4) is reported to use the expectations of family, group or nation as a guide to what constitutes right. One typically sees conformity to stereotypical images of what is majority or natural behavior. Erskine's (1970) data reporting moderate public levels of support for civil liberties combined with the conventional reasoner's orientation to what the majority holds to be right could offer clues to the existing levels of support for civil liberties.

The stage four orientation toward authority, fixed

rules and the maintenance of the social order possibly suggests that the individual will not focus upon the presumed essence of civil liberties questions. At this stage the social order is promulgated for its own sake. Actions of authority figures are seen as likely to be supported not because they are morally right but because the authority figure represents a legitimate wielder of power in the social order.

The stage three reasoner is oriented to that which pleases or helps others and is approved by them. Expressed civil liberties attitudes might be a function of what this type of reasoner perceives significant others to advocate in the domain of civil liberties. If indeed the majority of Americans are conventional level reasoners who also give only moderate levels of support for civil liberties, the task of promoting greater support may indeed be a difficult one.

At the pre-conventional level an individual using stage two reasoning sees right action as that which instrumentally satisifes one's own needs and occasionally the needs of others. Conceptually, one might expect this type of individual would manifest wider variations in reasoning, behavior and attitudes in the domain of civil liberties. The individual's responses, on both an attitudinal and action level, might even be similar to the post-conventional reasoner; however the underlying cognitive processes are likely to be different. The lower stage of the pre-conventional level, stage one, is seen as

responsive to labels of good and bad, avoidance of punishment, and an unquestioning deference to power.

Kohlberg's views and the studies of concrete (behavioral) and abstract attitudinal measures lead to some testable hypotheses. Concern as to the extent to which moral reasoning scores are separate from intelligence implies the need to measure the latter and correlate it separately with the civil liberties measures. The present research sought not only to find the relationships of moral reasoning and individual differences measures to civil liberties attitudes but also to a behavioral indicator of support for the right of free speech.

Hypotheses

For the relationships among civil liberties attitudes, a behavioral indicator of support for free speech, and moral reasoning it was hypothesized that:

1. Moral maturity scores would correlate positively with civil liberties attitude scores and with the behavioral indicator of support for an individual's freedom of speech.

2. Civil liberties attitude scores would be positively correlated with the behavioral indicator of support for free speech.

3. Free speech attitudes scores would be positively correlated with the behavioral indicator of support for free speech.

4. More people would be pro civil liberties on the attitudinal measure than on the behavioral measure.

In addition to the primary focus of the study seen in the hypotheses, a number of other individual difference variables were also investigated in relation to civil liberties attitudes and the behavioral measure of support for free speech. Among the chiefly personality variables that were investigated were: authoritarianism, dogmatism, self-esteem, flexibility, intelligence and empathy. Included among the demographic variables were: mother's and father's level of schooling, political orientation, political party affiliation and age.

Method

Subjects

Subjects were drawn from classes in the evening division of a large two year college located in the suburbs of New York City. Ages ranged from 18 to 64, with a median age of 26. Of the 162 subjects 77 were male and 85 were female. The subjects described their political orientation as follows: Republican 21, Democrat 37, Conservative 23, Independents 56 and "do not know"25. The subjects were employed in a variety of occupations ranging from unskilled to professional. Subjects were randomly assigned to group A ($n = 101$) or group B ($n = 61$). Each group received all of the moral maturity and civil liberties measures and some of the individual difference measures.

Instruments

The Purdue Score of Civil Liberties Attitudes was derived by Zalkind and Schwartz (1971) from the work of Remmers and Radler (1957) and Leidy (1964). Twenty items used individually in the Purdue Opinion Panel were incorporated into a total score. Some items are phrased for agreement to express a pro-civil liberties view; others are reversed. Each item is scored on a five point scale so that a high score indicates a pro-libertarian attitude. There was a maximum pro-libertarian score of 100 and a minimal score of 20 which was considered anti-libertarian. Split half reliabilities of the measures ranged from r = .59 (n = 162) to r = .73 (n = 199). Two subscales were also drawn from the Purdue measure. Seven of the twenty statements dealt with free speech. These seven statements became the first free speech subscale and included items on communists. A second subscale was derived by dropping two items that dealt with communists.

The behavioral measure contained a description of a fictitious conflict that was taking place on an upstate campus dealing with the issue of freedom of speech. Subjects were asked to provide a recommendation to the college president regarding a solution to the conflict. The subject could respond by indicating whether or not they felt that a professor who was promoting an apparent racist view should be

dismissed from the college. In addition, subjects had the opportunity to elaborate on their recommendation. Although the signature of each subject was on a separate piece of paper, almost a letter format, rather than in traditional petition format, we shall refer to the behavioral measure as a petition.

Moral maturity scores were derived from an application of Form A of the Moral Judgment Interview developed by Kohlberg. Protocol scoring procedures are found in Kohlberg's Manual (1973). Derivation of the Moral Maturity Score is available in an article by Blatt and Kohlberg (1973).

The measures of additional personality variables included in this study were: the Full Range Picture Vocabulary Test of Intelligence (Ammons and Ammons, 1949) a measure of emotional empathy (Mehrabian and Epstein, 1972), Coopersmith's (1967) Self-Esteem Inventory, a brief modification of the F Scale that was intended to measure authoritarianism (Zalkind and Dispenzieri, 1968), Ghiselli's (1971) Self-Esteem Scale, a measure of mental flexibility derived from the Gough-Sanford Rigidity Scale as presented by Rokeach (1960) and modified by Zalkind, Gaugler and Schwartz (1975), a measure of dogmatism derived from Rokeach's (1960) Form D and an additional measure of self esteem developed by Zellman and Sears (1971).

Procedure

The behavioral measure of support for the principle of freedom of speech was administered to randomly selected classes of students enrolled in social science courses in a two year

technically oriented college. The petition was presented by the experimenter as a tool that would be used by a college president whose campus was currently embroiled in a bitter dispute over the rights of a faculty member to express certain beliefs in a tax-supported institution. The administration of the petition was accomplished in such a manner that other students could not tell if any given subject signed the petition.

Several weeks after the petition was or was not signed another research associate appeared in the classes that had responded to the petition to administer a self-report questionnaire that contained the Purdue measure of support for civil liberties attitudes as well as a number of personality and demographic variables. The questionnaires were coded by each subject to allow them to be paired with the previously collected petitions. Two forms of the questionnaire, thus creating groups A and B, were used. The essential difference between the questionnaire forms was that they tapped different personality variables. After the questionnaires were paired with the petitions, subjects who had completed both sources of data were randomly selected to take the Kohlberg Moral Judgment Interview and the Full Range Picture Vocabulary Test, a brief measure of intelligence. In the assessment of moral reasoning scores the scorers were not cognizant of either the petition signing behavior or the civil liberties attitude scores, in an attempt to control for experimenter bias.

Treatment of the Data

The research approach was correlational in nature and did not involve experimental manipulation of those variables treated statistically as independent variables. The treatment of the data consisted primarily of a multiple regression analysis that allowed for the analyzing of the collective and separate contributions of two or more independent variables to the variation of each (i.e. civil liberties) dependent variable (Kerlinger and Pedhazur, 1973). The S.P.S.S. multiple regression analysis (Nie et al., 1975) used to analyze the data combines standard multiple regression and stepwise procedures to generate an equation that would indicate how scores on the independent variables could be weighted and summed to obtain the best prediction for a given dependent variable. In addition to the regression analysis an S.P.S.S. subprogram t test was used to test whether or not the differences between the two sample means were significant. Also those with high or low moral maturity scores were compared on the civil liberties measures.

Results

The results showed a pro-libertarian support level for the behavioral and attitudinal measures of civil liberties.

Insert Table 1 about here

In addition the two free speech subscale scores were in the pro-

libertarian direction.

The results only partially support hypothesis number one. Although the correlations between moral maturity scores and civil liberties attitude scores were in the predicted direction only one of the nine correlations was significant at the .05 level.

Insert Table 2 about here

The correlations between the moral maturity scores and the behavioral measure were all positive and significant at the .01 level.

Insert Table 3 about here

The results of the data analyses only partially support hypothesis two, concerning attitude-behavior relationships. In Table 4 one sees that only two correlations (both in group B) were significant at the .05 level.

Insert Table 4 about here

Hypothesis three was more strongly supported. Higher correlations were found for the free speech attitude subscores and the behavioral indicator of support for free speech than for the total measure of civil liberties support and the behavioral indicator. The results in Table 5 appear to confirm the fourth hypothesis which predicted that there would be more additudinal than behavioral support for civil liberties.

Insert Table 5 about here

In addition to the above analyses a test of the differences of the means of low moral reasoners (moral maturity scores from 100 to 250 and high moral reasoners (moral maturity scores from 351 to 500) on the Purdue scale total scores and the behavioral measure was made. The differences between the two groups for the Purdue measure was significant at the .05 level. Although low moral reasoners had pro-libertarian attitudes (Mean = 74.57), high moral reasoners were even more pro-libertarian (Mean = 81.96). The mean score for the middle group (moral maturity scores from 251 to 350) was 78.21. The difference between the low and high moral reasoners was significant at the .05 level ($t = 2.35$, $n = 44$).

Utilizing the same cutoff scores to define high and low moral reasoners as above, an analysis was conducted to determine whether the difference between the means of the two groups was significant for the behavioral measure. A t test of the significance of the difference of the mean scores on the behavioral measure was significant at the .001 level. High moral reasoners (Mean = 4.39) strongly supported the professor's right of free speech while low moral reasoners (Mean = 3.19) approached an average response of undecided (3.00). The mean response for the middle group was 3.40.

The relationships between the selected personality and

demographic variables can be seen in the results of the stepwise multiple regression analyses.

Insert Tables 6 and 7 about here

The analyses revealed that the brief measure of intelligence (the Full Range Picture Vocabulary Test) correlated (at the .01 level) with the behavioral measure of support for civil liberties (r's = .29 to .33, n = 162). The Purdue scores correlated with measures of authoritarianism (r = -.50, n = 61), dogmatism (r = -.50, n = 61), and the Zellman-Sears Self Esteem scores (r = .20 to .30, n = 162) at the .01 level.

Discussion

Before presenting a more detailed discussion of some aspects of the findings, attention is directed at what appear to be the highlights of the study. First, for the behavioral measure the chief correlates or predictors were different measures (moral maturity and intelligence) than those predicting the attitude scores (dogmatism and authoritarianism). (Tables 6 and 7).

Second, the moral development measure, though much more intricate to give and score, did not correlate much more than the simpler very brief intelligence measure. In seeking to predict civil liberties or other behaviors, it may be, then, that more attention should be given to the cognitive level of the individual, as well as to examination of reasoning processes.

The data indicate a generally pro-libertarian level of expressed civil liberties attitudes with a Mean of 78.27 (where the neutral point would be 60.00). This corresponds to the results of the 1968 data for the Metropolitan New York City area reported by Zalkind et al. (1975) where mean scores for three samples ranged from 76.8 to 81.4. In addition to the general measure of civil liberties attitudes the two Free Speech subscales were also responded to in a pro-libertarian manner.

The behavioral measure of support for an individual's right of free speech was intended to assess the level of support that would exist for the free speech rights of an individual who promoted what is considered by many to be a racist viewpoint. On a scale where a score of one was anti-libertarian, three undecided and five pro-libertarian, the mean response was 3.51.

The petition was designed in such a way that a pro-libertarian response involved a recommendation that a college professor not be fired because he supported and proclaimed the validity of Shockley's Theory of Dysgenics. It was reasoned that a truly

pro-libertarian individual would recognize that the right of free speech includes a responsibility to maintain and support the rights of others to express viewpoints that might be personally unacceptable.

An informal examination of the reasons given at the end of the petition by subjects regarding their position on the dismissal of the professor indicated the conflicts that such situations can cause. Some subjects recognized the right of free speech while they also focused upon their beliefs of the potential destructive quality of the professor's statements. What appears to emerge is that what is here operationally defined as the most extreme civil libertarian position (e.g., free speech for anyone and any view) is given a lower priority compared to some other values held by the respondent. This is, of course, a frequent condition in the clash or rights or values in civil liberties and ethical dillemmas.

The low correlational relationships reported between civil liberties attitudes and the behavioral measure may be a function of the usual host of problems concerning attitude-behavior relationships. The decision to take what might be a preferred position in the concrete behavioral situation compared to the libertarian position in the more abstract attitudinal measure may be contributing to the low correlations that emerged. It is speculated that if the data were reanalyzed with greater attention to the reasons behind the petition response, stronger relationships might well emerge between expressed attitudes and the behavioral indicator of support for civil liberties.

The lack of significance among the correlations (r's of .01, .06, and .17) between the total Purdue score and the behavioral measure may, in part, stem from the fact that the Purdue measure taps attitudes towards a number of civil liberties issues while the behavioral measure focuses specifically on the issue of freedom of speech for a presumably unpopular view. This potential probelm was anticipated and represents the reason that the two free speech subscales were extracted for analysis in relationship to the behavioral measure.

The correlations between the free speech subscales and the behavioral measure were slightly higher than those between the total Purdue scores and the behavior scores. (Table 4). These correlations, however, were still low (r's of .04 to .28). It was only in Group B that the correlations for the two subscales were significant at the .05 level (r's of .26 and .28); correlations between the free speech subscales and the behavioral measure for group A and for the combination of both groups were not significant at the .05 level (r's were from .04 to .12).

The small increases in the correlation coefficients when the free speech scores (rather than the more general Purdue score) were used is consistent with the most argued notion that attitudes reflect a readiness or preparation for behavior. Although the

increases in correlation coefficients were in the expected direction when the free speech attitude measures were used, it must be emphasized that the correlations remained low. It can thus be assumed that there would be no significance statistically for the size of the differences between correlations.

These low correlations may also be a function of conditions existing within the measurement process. The Purdue questionnaire systems remains unknown in the current research. If the salience were low compared to some other attitude system activated by the free speech petition then consistency between expressed attitudes and behavior would not necessarily be high. Although the attitude measures included a variety of situations, the behavioral measure dealt only with one conflict. A variety of behavioral or behavioral intention measures are needed, in part to see if the correlates of these are comparable to our findings. Different areas of intolerance need to be explored, as various studies have shown that civil liberties attitudes (and presumably behavior) vary depending on the deviant or unpopular group which the subject sees as a threat (Zellman, 1975, 1979, Sheinfeld and Zalkind, 1980). It could be that moral reasoning or intelligence score correlates imply that abilities, process or developmental measures are more helpful in forecasting behavior than attitudinal measures.

Overall, it is suggested that attempts to assess the relationships between civil liberties attitudes and civil

liberties related behaviors will necessitate complex research methods if the results are to be considered meaningful. Such research is likely to need a more comprehensive measurement of reasoning processes and pro and anti-libertarian attitudes.

In addition to using a behavioral as well as an attitudinal measure, the current investigation sought to determine whether Kohlberg's (1969) cognitive developmental theory of moral reasoning would enhance our understanding of civil liberties attitudes and/or could help predict to a behavioral indicator of support for civil liberties. The results may be seen as giving mild, qualified support to the developmental theoretical positions presented above. Correlational relationships between moral reasoning and measures of civil liberties attitudes were in the hypothesized positive direction but low and generally not significant (r's from .08 to .23). The behavioral measure correlated to moral reasoning scores, the correlations (r's from .28 to .46) were all significant at the .01 level. But, the brief 10 minute intelligence measure zero order correlation was practically the same as the far more difficult to administer and score Kohlberg measure. (Table 6). There is a need to see what role is played by intelligence or cognitive variables with educational levels other than our college sample.

The emergence of correlations of low magnitude coupled with the findings of significant differences in mean scores among attitudes and behaviors for the high and low moral reasoners suggests that a linear correlational approach may not be the most productive, even though the high, middle and low categories did fit here. The possibility also exists that the large number of subjects at stage three (118 of the 162 subjects) may be that which accounts for the low magnitude of the obtained correlations.

According to the theory, the stage three moral reasoner believes something to be moral to the extent that it conforms to the expectations of others and tends to promote interpersonal relations (i.e., they want to be accepted by significant others). A stage three reasoner might hold either anti-libertarian, or neutral or prolibertarian views in response to his perception of what significant others expect of him. A shift in the attitudinal system of the reference group or realignment with another group with a differing set of attitudes might result in a shift on the individual level. Without the knowledge of what the stage three reasoner believes is expected of him, difficulty in predicting the civil liberties attitudes would be anticipated. The identification of those groups or individuals that a given stage three reasoner uses as a reference may enable future research in the area of civil liberties and moral reasoning to develop a more accurate predictive capacity

regarding attitudes and civil liberties oriented behavior.

One limitation of the current investigation, identified in retrospect, is the relatively small number of subjects who were pre-conventional moral reasoners (n = 21, all were stage two reasoners) and an even smaller number of subjects who were post-conventional reasoners (n = 5, all used stage 5 reasoning in excess of 50% of their responses). It is suggested that if the data included a broader range of reasoning processes and reference groups were used for moderating variables, the capacity to predict civil liberties responses would be greater.

In spite of the above limitations it is interesting to note that there were significant correlations found between moral reasoning and the behavioral indicator of support for civil liberties but not with the attitude measure. It is necessary to reaffirm that although the correlations for behavior were statistically significant they were not of a very high magnitude (r's of .28, .33 and .46). It is possible that support for the college professor's right of free speech may be a function of his status compared to the individuals referred to in the Purdue measure (i.e., Communists, foreigners, criminals etc.). Support for the civil liberties of a variety of individuals is likely to result in cognitively complex process. Conflicting attitudinal systems might result in lower levels of support for some individuals (i.e., Communists, foreigners, criminals etc.) than others (i.e.,

college professors described as being of high quality).

The status issue is a clouded one and may well become a fruitful area for future civil liberties research. The higher linear relationships that emerge between moral reasoning and the behavioral measure (when contrasted to the moral reasoning and attitude correlations) could be influenced by the presumably relatively high status among conventional reasoners of the college professor, at least when compared to Communists, foreigners and criminals.

It is also possible that the basis for supporting the decision to remove the professor from his job is a function of how threatening he is perceived to be or, conversely, whether he seems to be opposing what the subject sees as a threat. Further study with respect to the status variable and degree of perceived threat (emphasized by Zellman, 1975), 1979) is suggested.

Earlier in the discussion it was suggested that the most civil libertarian response may be in conflict with other values. Most free speech measures, of necessity, attempt to pose some such conflict. Higher correlations may emerge if research strategies focus upon moral reasoning in relation to the type of reasoning that is used to resolve the conflicts, if any, that arise as a result of exposure to concrete situations having to do with civil liberties, such as the one

used in this investigation. The behavior which was operationally defined as the most civil libertarian response may have occurred for reasons other than a strong level of support for civil liberties; support for free speech of a Shockley viewpoint may not have been a concern for free speech as such. Similar problems may cloud the moral reasoning-civil liberties relationship.

Overall, it is suggested that the relationship between moral reasoning and civil liberties behavior and attitude measures may be more clearly understood if one does not start with the assumption that variance on behavioral and attitudinal measures will be accounted for by the same variables. As Kohlberg has focused upon the nature of the reasoning processes behind moral decisions, so might the researcher in the area of civil liberties. Perhaps Kohlberg's well echoed belief that it is the structure behind a moral decision that makes it moral, is also applicable to the study of civil liberties attitudes and behaviors. The development of moral dilemmas, such as those used by Kohlberg, focusing upon issues of civil liberties may represent the starting point of a process through which the basic structure of pro and anti-libertarian reasoning may become known.

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Table 1

Means and Standard Deviations

For Measures of

Civil Liberties and Moral Reasoning

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.
Groups A and B Combined		
Purdue Score	78.27	10.06
Civil Liberties Petition	3.51	1.26
Free Speech Score Without Items on Communists	19.01	3.31
Free Speech Score With Items on Communists	25.77	4.71
Kohlberg Moral Maturity Scores	299.58	51.11

Table 2

Correlation Between Moral Maturity Scores

And Civil Liberties Attitude Scores

Civil Liberties Attitude Score	Group A	Group B	Combined
Total Purdue Score	.11	.13	.11
Free Speech Score With Items on Communists	.08	.23	.13
Free Speech Score Without Items on Communists	.13	.23	.16*

Group A n = 101 Group B n = 61 Combined n = 162

*$p < .05$

Table 3

Correlation Between Moral Maturity Scores

And Civil Liberties Behavior Score

Group A	Group B	Combined
.28**	.46**	.38**

Group A n = 101 Group B n = 61 Combined n = 162

** $p < .01$

Table 4

Correlation Between Civil Liberties Attitude Scores

And Civil Liberties Behavior Score

Civil Liberties Attitude Scores	Group A	Group B	Combined
Total Purdue Score	.01	.17	.06
Free Speech Score With Items on Communists	.05	.26*	.11
Free Speech Score Without Items on Communists	.04	.28*	.12

Group A n = 101 Group B n = 61 Combined n = 162

*p .05

Table 5

Percent of Subjects Having Pro Civil Liberties Position On Behavioral and Attitude Measures Of Civil Liberties

	Group A	Group B	Combined
Behavioral Measure	70	55	65
Total Purdue Score	77	82	79
Free Speech Score With Items on Communists	87	88	87
Free Speech Score Without Items on Communists	83	92	86

Group A n = 101 Group B n = 61 Combined n = 162

Table 6

Groups A and B Combined

Stepwise Multiple Regression

On Behavioral Measure of Civil Liberties

For Those Measures Used With Both Groups

Variable	Multiple R	R Square	Simple r
Kohlberg's Moral Maturity Score	.33	.11	.33
+ Intelligence	.40	.16	.30
+ Age	.44	.19	-.12
+ Self-Esteem - Ghiselli	.45	.20	-.04
+ Political Activity	.46	.21	.09
+ Political Orientation	.46	.21	.01
+ Father's Schooling	.46	.21	.11
+ Mother's Schooling	.46	.22	.02
+ Purdue Scale Total	.47	.22	.06
+ Self-Esteem Zellman	.47	.22	.12
Constant			

n = 162

Table 7

Group B - Stepwise Multiple Regression

On Purdue Attitude Scale Scores

Variable	Multiple R	R Square	Simple r
Dogmatism	.50	.25	-.50
+ Authoritarianism	.62	.38	-.50
+ Political Orientation	.63	.40	.28
+ Intelligence	.64	.40	.14
+ Kohlberg's Moral Maturity Score	.64	.41	.13
+ Civil Liberties Behavior Score	.65	.42	.17
+ Father's Schooling	.65	.43	.15
+ Self-Esteem Coopersmith	.66	.43	.15
+ Political Activity	.66	.43	-.14
+ Age	.66	.43	-.10
constant			

n = 61